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This thesis is an examination of the printed media in France (1955-1963), as 
represented by two mainstream newspapers: Le Monde (left-centrist) and Le Figaro 
(right-centrist).  Using these newspapers, as well as Gallup polls recorded at the time, this 
study explores correlations of what was reported in newspapers and how French public 
opinion evolved during the course of the war. These two major sources of information are 
shown to have given contradictory information, thus accounting for some of the 
paradoxes found in public opinion polls.  Specifically, the paradoxes analyzed in the 
study concern the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the Pieds-Noirs (the 
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In the society of the spectacle, only what appears exists.  




Events matter as they are seen to matter and are seen as they are shown. 



















The Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) remains a tumultuous and enigmatic 
chapter in modern French history.  Consequently, the quantity of literature on this period 
is enormous. It is the aim of this study to provide a unique perspective by drawing upon 
both cognitive theory and content analysis techniques in an attempt to uncover underlying 
ideology present in two mainstream French newspapers, Le Monde and Le Figaro.1 In 
doing so, one may better understand the underpinnings of French public opinion vis-à-vis 
certain aspects of the war. In particular, this thesis explores public attitudes on the leading 
rebel group, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), as well as attitudes concerning the 
European settlers of Algeria (Pieds-Noirs).   
Although proving that an agenda-setting function of the media exists is not an aim 
of the study, seeking correlations between mass attitudes and what was presented in the 
press is nonetheless informative.  Attitudes were slow to change, which, in turn, may 
have prolonged the conflict. Exploring this phenomenon of change via the press the 
fundamental goal of this study. To begin to understand the complexity of this press-
                                                 
1 These two newspapers were chosen, first, because of the predominance of the printed press in the 
1950s and early 1960s. Second, they both enjoyed a wide circulation. Thus, they can be reasonably 
posited as influencing a wide swath of public opinion.  However, Le Figaro was more conservative, 
pro-war and popular, whereas Le Monde was more liberal and even somewhat scholarly. Exploring 
their differences, then, can paint an interesting picture of the argumentative landscape at the time of 
the war, as well as shed light on the research questions posed.  The choice is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter III. 
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public relationship during the revolution, a brief history and analysis of the conflict is 
given in Chapter II. 
Several elements in particular drive this research on the Algerian war. First, how 
do Le Monde and Le Figaro differ, and how are these differences seen in the layout of the 
newspaper?  The study approaches this question in Chapter III by outlining the two 
newspapers and the post World War II press system in France. This is done in order to 
determine how each paper ideologically relates to the other, and how these differences 
condition ensuing differences in coverage. The external, “phenotypical” differences are 
analyzed with tools from the domain of content analysis. Some of these tools were 
preexisting and others are techniques that were generated for the unique problems 
presented by quantitatively comparing two different newspapers. Chapter IV explains the 
theory behind the coding techniques.  
From this theory, a perception index emphasizing the perceptive value of each 
story in each newspaper is generated.  This index, explained in Chapter V, is necessary 
because measuring front-page space dedicated to the conflict alone, as is generally the 
case, is an inadequate basis for subsequent analysis.  Essentially, this index serves to boil 
down stylistic differences in each newspaper to figures estimating the effect on the 
reader’s perception of the stories.  The conclusion is that, despite a lesser amount of 
space accorded to the war by Le Figaro, other visual features of the newspaper render its 
effect on the reader similar to that of Le Monde.  Because these newspapers had different 
views of the war, contradicting signals of similar strength were sent by the press to 
readers about the war.  The result is that an insufficient quantity and quality of 
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information was available to influence the reader and lead opinion to favor independence 
for Algeria. Indeed, many years passed before such a notion of independence was even 
acceptable to Metropolitan French (residents of the "Metropole" or continental France), 
as will be shown by public opinion polls. 
 Also in Chapter V, there is a comparison of the types of stories each newspaper 
favored. In this respect, three different levels of stories are distinguished on the basis of 
the type of parties and action depicted in the story. Level 1 stories depict violent events; 
level 2 stories report political events within France and Algeria; level 3 stories depict 
third party involvement, such as with the United Nations.  These differences are explored 
in terms of a quantity/quality necessity of information for opinion change.  Chapter VI 
describes the mechanisms of this process. 
Qualitative content analysis is performed after filtering the stories through certain 
categories used for the study, to paint a precise ideological landscape produced by the 
above-mentioned differences between the newspapers.  For example, the number of 
stories relating violent events in each newspaper is compared. Additionally, however, a 
qualitative distinction is made as to the specific nature of violent events reported. Some 
violent events, for example, result from extremist elements in the French army yet others 
from Algerian terrorism.  
In Chapter VI, the study focuses on cognitive theories and public opinion polls to 
establish links between what was being reported and where the French Metropole was 
ideologically situated during the war. The object here is to better understand the 
philosophical climate during the 1950s and early 1960s and how change came about in 
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the hearts and minds of a nation.  While analyzing public opinion, questions were 
generated concerning the French population of Algeria and the main opposition 
organization on the Algerian side, the FLN.  The two questions explored include the 
following: the surprising lack of concern for the French population of Algeria and an 
intriguing change in the esteem held for the FLN by the French over the course of the 
war.  Drawing from both the results of the quantitative content analysis set up in Chapter 
IV, as well as the historical record, the possible reasons why this double paradox existed 



















 THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
 
Les peuples sont entraînés dans un flot d’événements tumultueux et tragiques dont tout 
homme, qu’il le veuille ou non, est l’auteur autant que le spectateur, le bénéficiaire, ou la 
victime. En acceptant passivement sa défaite, la France eut consommé sa propre perte.  
(First post World War II issue of Le Monde, December 1944) 
 
Nations are pulled into a series of tumultuous and tragic events during which each man, 
whether he wishes it or not, is the author as much as the spectator, the beneficiary as 
much as the victim.  By passively accepting its defeat, France had absorbed its own loss.  
 
 The principal independent variable in my study is, of course, “la guerre 
d’Algérie,” or the Algerian Revolution, as it is more aptly known. A comprehensive look 
at the conflict would be optimal, but the crux of this paper is less historical (in the sense 
of adding new primary sources to the record) than analytical. For those less familiar with 
the historical aspects of the conflict, Appendix A outlines a chronology. In effect, the 
study aims to derive data with techniques not limited to this event, but applicable to other 
points in history and other forms of media than the printed format.  So, a brief analysis of 
the Algerian Revolution will furnish some reference points without becoming too 
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encumbered by the enormous bank of historical facts that has been established by 
scholars in the years after the conflict. 
 One of the aspects that originally led me to study this bloody instance of 
decolonization was the socioeconomic complexity of Algeria itself.  For example, by 
1954, alongside Arabic and Berber populations, one million Pieds-Noirs (Algerian 
residents of European descent) lived and worked in Algeria, often in the same miserable 
conditions as their Arabic and Berber indigenous counterparts. This sort of cultural 
diversity and proximity has created challenges for many modern states, but in this case, 
the interests of the Metropole often did not coincide with those of many of the 
communities in Algeria, native and settler alike. Pacifying one side often led to angering 
the other. And the phenomenon of unchanging sides throughout the conflict, existing in 
bilateral or trilateral relation to one another, was rarely the case. Taking advantage of the 
army’s successes in 1957, most notably the Battle of Algiers (January-March 1957), 
General Salan took de facto control of the French government in Algiers. The weakened 
resident-général (a Metropole-appointed governor) Robert Lacoste was unable to resist. 
Later, the army itself fractioned into differing sides, one camp comprising Gaullist 
supporters and the other a more radical group, the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS).  
The members of this latter formed a part of what are referred to as ultras or activistes.  
The OAS formed in opposition to de Gaulle after the French government appeared to be 
drifting closer to the idea of an independent Algeria in the middle stages of the conflict. 
But by 1961, after a failed putsch by the OAS generals, the army lost the confidence of 
many French citizens, and radical commandos continued to carry out terrorist activities 
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against noncompliant Europeans. On different occasions even de Gaulle himself was 
targeted by the OAS.  
By the same token the nationalist Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and its 
armed branch, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), instituted a policy of 
eliminating those in opposition to their cause. Such opponents included both the Harkis, 
who were French-supported Muslim fighters, as well as French-sympathetic Caïds 
(community and regional leaders). Rival organizations were not spared either. The 
Mouvement Nationaliste Algérien (MNA) was targeted for some time before the FLN 
established itself as the premier independence organization. The Gouvernement 
Provisionnel de la République Algérienne (GPRA) came into existence later in the war, 
alongside the FLN, as the premier organization representing interests of the Algerian 
people. Benjamin Stora reports that as many as 10,000 casualties resulted from the MNA-
FLN internecine power struggles alone (1993: 12).  Strife was not limited to Algeria, and 
like the disagreements in the French army, the internal conflict of the Algerians landed 
explosively in France. This broadening of the war had the effect of increasing the sense 
of urgency of the war for the people of France.   
 Another unconventional feature of the Algerian Revolution concerns Ahmed Ben 
Bella, one of the founding FLN members and the first president of independent Algeria. 
Ben Bella was imprisoned for most of the war after having his plane hijacked by the 
French army, but still managed to control substantial movements, both ideological and 
material, of the independence cause. Linked to the FLN, the GPRA was presided over by 
the more moderate Ferrhat Abbas. Often this organization negotiated as the voice of the 
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Algerian side with the French.  Thus, one can see that the landscape of those actively 
engaged in the conflict is littered with the irony and contradiction so often bred by war. 
The Metropolitan (continental France) interests clashed with both Pieds-Noirs and 
Muslims, with the latter two fighting fiercely against each other.  These features worked 
to prolong the bloodshed and drive the conflict to its most gruesome and tragic moments.  
 Despite longstanding European and African interaction, the explosive cultural 
predicament in Algeria erupting in the initial uprising on All Saints’ Day in 1954 can be 
traced to the 1830s.  Long before Bismarck’s carving of Africa in 1884, France began to 
pursue the doctrine of establishing a colonie de peuplement (settlement colony) whereby 
commercial links between the metropole and the colony were put in place and fortified 
(Reinhard, 2000: 13). Another feature of this type of colonization is that the metropole 
attempted to permanently establish an elite class of settlers to promulgate not only 
commercial interests but, implicitly, cultural interests as well. Perhaps a “clash of 
civilizations” was bound to arise with such a system in place but the historical 
humiliation the Algerians came to know was less a result of mere cultural differences 
than the system of socioeconomic subjugation that was present.               
  Algerian rebel action persisted throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, especially 
with the infamous and fierce al-Amir Abdel Kader, but insufficient material and 
ideological resources constantly plagued these movements.  The asymmetrical nature of 
military resources was especially apparent, which perhaps influenced the other factor, 
that of lack of popular support. This disconnect between self-determination struggles and 
popular support was also caused by the educational deficit that the country as a whole 
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experienced, although this lack was unarguably felt more severely by the Algerians. The 
French administration realized the educational rift but the problem persisted, as is 
demonstrated by the unsuccessful attempts by France to placate the Algerians through 
reforms in the 1950s.  
     By the 1950s and 1960s, facilitating the independence of Algeria, in retrospect the 
most democratic solution, was complicated by two principal features. The first, of 
paramount importance, is that Algeria was considered by the French as an indivisible part 
of the Metropole. Inequalities were felt to be an internal problem to France, but there was 
much disagreement as to the resolution of social problems in Algeria.  Indeed genuine 
attempts at reform were made by government officials throughout both the Fourth and 
Fifth Republics.  As explained in Chapter IV with theories of perception, these reforms 
probably contributed to the cognitive balance carried by French citizens. This in turn led 
to a continuation of the status quo, and therefore the war.  However, as is often the case 
in asymmetrical guerrilla or terrorist warfare (especially as is the case currently in Israel 
and Palestine, as well as in India and Pakistan), the no-holds-barred, tunnel-vision 
purpose held by radicals tends to sweep aside moderating elements.  The fate of the 
GPRA leader Abbas is a classic example of this phenomenon—he even changed his 
ideology to accept more radical tenets over the course of the war, as his sway over the 
people become more unsteady.  The ultras, too, ultimately eliminated the possibility for 
not only integration, as many French came to desire at one point, but also any potential 
for rapprochement between the two resident communities in Algeria after the conflict. By 
May 1962, thousands of Pieds-Noirs were leaving each day, despite coercive measures 
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enacted by the OAS to keep them there.  In July, those who remained paid with their lives 
in a tragic massacre.  
 A second point blocking the path to independence, related to the first, includes the 
economic and security interests that France had in Algeria. Not only would the loss of 
many Pied-Noirs holdings probably be concomitant with the elimination of French 
authority in Algeria, but additionally the Sahara, desired for its oil reserves and status as 
nuclear testing grounds, rendered the French government increasingly reluctant to 
relinquish territorial claims. So, one can begin to see that, despite the proximity (thematic 
and temporal) to the conflict in Indochina, numerous factors still complicated the 
subsequent strife with Algeria. François Mitterrand, then minister of the Interior, summed 
it up best by saying: “l’Algérie, c’est la France” (Algeria is France), which is particularly 
fitting as this was indeed considered a purely domestic issue (Greilsamer 1990: 493).  
Even in the newspapers, articles grouped specifically under the rubric of “foreign news” 
never included Algeria during the course of the conflict, and for some time after.  
 Thus only through steady indications as to the lost nature of Algeria and the 
cautious albeit ambiguous leadership of de Gaulle (who uttered the phrase “l’Algérie 
française” but once), did the tide begin to swing. Notable personalities on the left such as 
Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre, as well as Albert Camus, joined in the tirade 
against French military action as spiritedly as they condemned terrorist activities.  Henri 
Alleg’s book exposing systematic torture on the part of the French army, La Question 
(1958), was another important feature swaying opinion and the press. In September 1959, 
de Gaulle delivered a speech in favor of Algeria’s process towards self-determination. 
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Although leaving the how and when of the process essentially unanswered, de Gaulle’s 
words provoked the erection of barricades by the ultras in Algeria in 1960.  Eventually, 
as mentioned above, statements and action by de Gaulle led to the putsch in April 1961, 
from which the prestige and privileged position of the army in Algeria would never 
recover.  Finally, and highlighting a complex phenomenon to be explored in greater depth 
below, “pressée d’en finir, l’opinion publique désigne le FLN comme Interlocuteur 
Algérien” (Chatelain 1962: 42).2 To conclude, the relations between Algeria and France 
cooled somewhat quickly, as the French pulled out of their military bases years before the 
agreed date, and, as mentioned above, the Europeans emptied their homes and “returned” 












                                                 





                                       THE PRESS IN FRANCE 
 
                                              The Fourth Estate 
Post-revolutionary France has seen a general trend towards an increasingly free 
press, though difficult moments were experienced by champions of press liberty during 
the Algerian Revolution.  Modernizing, liberal press reforms were first instituted in 
France around 1789.  Another landmark year for the press in terms of expanded legal 
rights was 1881 when progressive politicians such as Jules Ferry saw such change as vital 
to the continued vigor of France during this period of unparalleled external European 
expansion.  Suffice it to sketch out, for the purposes of this study, some principal 
characteristics of the post World War II press in France.  
As the Algerian problems became more pressing, some elements of the media 
began to clash more frequently with the government. The root of this friction is found in 
the differing expectations that each side carried regarding the wartime duty of the press. 
The interests of the government were in retaining French territory and maintaining the 
status quo; thus the government’s interest would implicitly be that the press and other 
potential opponents remain compliant during the war.  However the interests of the press 
were, by nature, less material-bound.  Newspapers such as Le Monde and Le Figaro were 
indeed patronized by French citizens living in the Maghrib (North Africa), but Pied-Noir 
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publications, such as L’Echo d’Alger, enjoyed closer connections to the European settlers 
in Algeria.  As a result of being based physically and ideologically in the Metropole, as 
well as having to face competition from Pieds-Noirs publications, the link between Le 
Monde and Le Figaro and the settler populace was brittle.  Certainly, the latter link was 
more brittle than that shared between the national government and the settlers. Indeed, 
this tenuous relation is emblematic of deeper problems of disconnect between the 
mainland and Maghribine French.  These differing interests and associations (notably the 
lesser interests Le Monde carried vis-à-vis Algeria) are also why change could occur in a 
more rapid pace at Le Monde than government and military policy.  
The press corps and public were undoubtedly conditioned by the previous 
prolonged imbroglio in southeast Asia, although if any anti-war sentiments were borne 
from Indochina, it took years to witness the fruition of them. Because of the brief 
interlude betwixt the conflicts, “the French could not profit from a calmer period to 
analyze more serenely the loss of their colonies in Indochina” (Cenerelli 17: 2000). So, in 
the nascent years of the Algerian conflict, as was the case with Indochina, mainstream 
editors clung to the idea of a French-held colony. In terms of historical and economic 
ties, in fact, more deeply rooted sentiments were probably evoked with the Algerian 
conflict than with Indochina.  
Time was necessitated for change. Additionally, as was the case in Indochina, the 
press was relatively confined in its investigative leeway, both geographically and in terms 
of censorship. There was a general reliance on the Agence France-Presse (AFP), an 
agency akin to the Associated Press or Reuters, for receiving information from the 
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region. The implications of this reliance were rather problematic. First, AFP was a state-
regulated organization (établissement public administratif) the financial dependency of 
which “weakened their ability to resist the government’s sometimes insistent incursions” 
(Cenerelli 2000: 3). The board of directors included many government bureaucrats until 
1957 (Charon 1991: 120). And controlling the source of news played a major part in 
determining the selection of stories the newspapers could choose from. Even if there was 
a better worldwide infiltration of correspondents during the 1950s, one could suppose 
that such strong-arm tactics by the government paved the way normatively for subsequent 
interventions into individual publications. The Cold War, Algeria, and Indochina “ont 
entraîné un renforcement de la législation exceptionnelle permettant de suspendre la 
liberté de la presse en crise” (Bellanger et al 1975 : 247).3 
 Even the newspapers themselves were dependent upon aid from the government 
for years to follow. Aid included, according to Santini and government reports, 
reductions in telegrams (which began in 1886), long-distance telephone usage (from 
1951), and postal usage. Basically, the brunt of aid was given through state-run agencies.4 
Interestingly, Le Monde unilaterally attempted to hike the price of the newspaper in 1956, 
and was stopped only temporarily by a governmental decree.  In any case, aid in France is 
more than in other countries in Europe (5.6 billion francs for 13,000 publications by 
1985), yet prices for publications are relatively high (Goux and Forgues 1985: 22). The 
                                                 
3 Caused an exceptional reinforcement of the press, allowing for a suspension of the liberty of the 
press during crises. 
4 There is apparently even more of a tradition in this domain than one might think: “Le règne actuel 
des aides obliques à la presse est le résultat d’une évolution de près de deux siècles…l’Etat a été 
conduit à développer les avantages financiers spécifiques accordés aux enterprises de la profession.” 
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final analysis as to the actual benefit of this subsidization has, thus, given rise to 
polemics.5  The Journal Officiel de la République Française reports that in 1974 Le 
Monde would sell from 2.89 francs without aid, compared with the then price of 2.50 
francs; it continues by saying that “l’aide n’est pas faite pour permettre des 
‘superbénéfices’ mais pour maintenir une certaine diversité d’expression et favoriser le 
progrès de la presse” (653).6 Thus, the positive side of subsidizing the press includes the 
following: first, that profitable, maudlin displays of entertainment could be avoided; 
secondly, a greater variety of opinions could give the consumer a chance to better inform 
his or her particular political decision.   
By contrast, the monies given imbue the state with a sort of interventionary 
authority.  A government report states baldly that the idea of the independence of the 
press is clearly false (Vedel 1979: 84).  Indeed during the war a flood of new laws 
appeared concerning the government’s powers in constraining the press, notably the  
April 3 law, which inaugurated formal government censorship.  Government involvement 
generally increased throughout the years, with more laws that augmented the president’s 
ability to “black line” an article.  One law, invoked 118 times, allowed him to do this if 
                                                                                                                                                 
(The current press subsidies are the result of  two centuries of previous aid…the State has been driven 
to develop specific financial advantages accorded to press enterprises) (Goux and Fourgues1985: 21). 
5 Santini says that this aid was too much, and the capitalist proprietors were benefiting to an inordinate 
degree: “Pourqoui continuer à accorder une aide fiscale à ceux qui n’en ont guère besoin?” (Why 
continue to give aid to those who scarcely need it?)  (1966: 10). Freiberg, writing from a neo-Marxist 
perspective, and those writing for the government reports throughout the 1970s and 1980s, disagree 
reasoning that the more independent the press was from forces of the free-market, the more genuine 
the news could be (1981). 
6 Subsidies were not intended to create ‘superbenefits’ but to maintain a certain diversity of expression 




his honor and dignity were put into question. Another law bestowed upon the government 
the right to block press items questioning the administration’s Algerian policies. 
Interestingly, it has been observed that François Mitterrand, ranking highly in the 
government throughout the 1950s, instigated some of these rows.  Seizures occurred 
regularly, and L’Humanité, the communist newspaper, was even banned altogether in 
1959 (Freiberg 1981: 53).  An especially wrenching year for the press was 1958, when an 
unprecedented number of newspapers were seized (Bellanger et al. 1975: 58). Le Monde 
was seized a stunning 37 times in 1958.  The journalists, with better access to information 
(especially compared to Indochina), were increasingly put in positions of choice between 
the government’s interests and the hard truth that the events bespoke.  The events in 
Algeria, recalls Pierre Limagne, “ont représenté un drame de conscience terrible pour la 
plupart des journalistes français qui eurent à les ‘couvrir,’” permitting the journalists to 




Le Temps is often cited as the direct progenitor of Le Monde. It is probably more 
accurate, however, to describe Le Monde as a less-than-faithful reconstitution of Le 
Temps, generated from certain materials and personnel from before the war, yet 
irrevocably changed.  To punish Nazi collaborators, the French government banned all 
                                                 
7 The events in Algeria represented a terrible conscience crisis for the French journalists who had to 




newspapers still publishing a fortnight after the Nazi incursion into southern France in 
November 1942. It is generally accepted that this decree targeted Le Temps since 
publication had continued three days after the blackout period had passed (November 
29th). Before the war, Le Temps was exposed as a proprietorship of the Comité des forges 
(the steel trust), which provoked chagrin on the part of those who wished the press to be 
free from bourgeois interests.8 Le Temps had earned a reputation as the unofficial 
mouthpiece of the quai d’Orsay, (the seat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris) and 
was a moderate supporter of the government since the Third Republic; before, it was a 
liberal opponent of the Second Empire.  Of course, this recessive trait of activism would 
again manifest itself as the director, Hubert Beuve-Méry (HBM), a former diplomatic 
correspondent of Le Temps (1934-1938), became a fiery critic of some Algerian policies 
later in the conflict. “Une chose est certaine : Le Monde n’est pas un journal officieux,” 
says Chatelain (1962: 176).9 After World War II, Le Monde became a self-described 
maison de verre (glass house) as Beuve-Méry made transparent financial materials of the 
financially struggling publication (Chatelain 1962: 26).  In May 1956, Beuve-Méry gave 
the Conferences des ambassadeurs, displaying his belief that the press must 
independently inform the public.      
Beuve-Méry, or “Sirius” (his preferred nom de plume) was a pillar of his 
organization, much like Pierre Brisson was at Le Figaro. Also like Brisson he was active 
in managerial as well as compositional aspects of the newspaper for several years after 
                                                 
8 After the war it became custom in the organization to horizontally pass controlling stocks from 
director to director, while the employees gradually held higher percentages of stocks. 
9 One thing is certain: Le Monde is not an official publication (176). 
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the tenuous war period, until the next troubles in May 1968. In a rather bizarre episode, 
he was actually fired in 1951 and then recalled, though only through the good offices and 
wide support of his employees. With “des goûts modestes” (modest tastes) and “un 
mépris de l’argent” (contempt for money), Beuve-Méry was too good of a fit for the 
purist newspaper (Chatelain 1962: 189).  Possessing a reputation for publishing the 
unpublishable at times, he offered to his readers such material as an International Red 
Cross-sponsored, confidential report on Algeria (Chatelain 1962: 189). Concerning the 
Algerian Revolution, however, Beuve-Méry’s views changed considerably in the course 
of the conflict. In the early years, like many French citizens, he was reluctant to radically 
alter the role of France in Algerian affairs. But after massacres of women and children in 
Phillippeville in August 1955, and continuing bloodshed, he became a prudent supporter 
of decolonization (Greilswamer 1990). The ensuing reports of torture hardened his 
position against the conflict, although he remained equally steadfast against many 
policies of the FLN, most notably the activities of terrorist nature. The study will 
investigate such trends as manifested in the newspaper later in this paper.  
Hubert Beuve-Méry was, from a Marxist perspective, the “essence of non-
socialist but progressive Christian Liberalism” (Freiberg 1981: 85). The same individual 
even went as far to say that Le Monde became “socialistic,” hence fulfilling the criterion 
of choice for analysis as a reasonable contrast to Le Figaro.10 Self censorship probably 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 By no means does this signify a convenient coupling with interests on the left; attacks from the left 
were mounted as well, since HBM was suspicious of the supposedly communist-supported G.P.R.A.; 
l’Humanité, at different points in the conflict harangued and congratulated Le Monde for certain of its 
policies, especially later on (Chatelain 1962: 185). 
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also occurred, as it did in the 1970s when it resulted in the firing of a writer, Philippe 
Simmonot (who fired off a book of his own in response).  Furthermore, Le Monde was 
attached to its independence as well as the concept of transparency, and avoided the grip 
of the publishing group Hachette. This independence permitted a certain flexibility for 
change and modification throughout the conflict, since the mandate of neither one man 
nor one party had to be attended to.  Indeed Bellanger labels Le Monde of the era one of 
the “quatre grands de la contre-propagande française,” (four major propagators against 
the governement’s view) (1975: 451). The paper had indeed already adopted a reformist 
tone vis-à-vis the Union Française in course of the conflict in Indochina (451). In any 
case, the 37 times that the newspaper was banned in 1958 speaks well to this not so well 
received reformist quality adopted by the management. Some high-ranking government 
officials even called to suspend publication as early as 1956, as was done with 
L’Humanité. In January 1957, a high government official in Algeria, Robert Lacoste, 
seized Le Monde in Algeria.  He then followed up with later seizures of the paper.  More 
loudly, though, rang the menace that OAS plastiqueurs (or “la nouvelle Mafia” as HBM 
called them) presented to collaborators to the newspaper and HBM himself.  These 
plastiqueurs, named for their preferred explosive materials and devices, would terrorize 
French leaders and society through the political conclusion of the Revolution in 1962. 
  Besides providing a good foil to the Figaro, other characteristics of Le Monde 
make it a good object of analysis for this study.  Chatelain notes that “Après des années 
de lecture quotidienne du Monde, un grand nombre de lecteurs ne cessent encore de se 
poser des questions: ‘quelles opinions politiques représente le journal…des évolutions 
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peuvent-elles être constatées?’”(1962: 16).11 A study, therefore, is well invited to 
investigate this trend.  The newspaper enjoyed in those years, as today, a top-notch 
reputation for objective reporting, becoming more objective as it became less afraid of 
legal consequences.12 Therefore despite the relatively small daily circulation reported as 
230,000 in 1958 the influence extended widely, and to a younger, better-educated 
audience than Le Figaro (Andrews 1962: 22).  Bellanger reports that although the cadres 
(upper-middle class) made up 14.1% of the population, this class made up 45.5% percent 
of the readership in 1960 (463). Thus, the audience was indeed large and because of its 
trusted reputation as a source for information, Le Monde probably swayed more people 
per individual newspaper than any other paper. The section on perception and public 
opinion will treat these aspects in greater detail.        
 
Le Monde: Appearance, or “Phenotype” 
The focus of the study is the change and comparison over time between the two 
newspapers.  As for Le Monde, the most immediately noticeable characteristic is the 
simplicity of layout, a “genetically” inherited feature from Le Temps. Noticeably missing 
from the front pages are items like cartoons and photographs. The total pages, indicated 
at the top of each dernière édition (final print), generally increased over time.  In 1955, 
12-16 page editions were the norm, while in 1963, this total rose to 16-24 pages, with 
                                                 
11 After years of daily subscription, a large number of readers still ask themselves: ‘What political 
opinions does the newspaper represent? Can evolutions of thought be observed?’  
12 Hechter (2001) produced an interesting historical case study in this regard showing the greater 




consistently less during the sultry summer months of vacation. A sixth column was added 
in 1961. In a more precise fashion, Andrews notes that the average number of pages in 
Parisian newspapers in 1951 was around 8.7 and rose above 16 between 1962 and 1963. 
Throughout these pages, little regularity was noticed in regards to the order of subjects 
presented. Domestic and international news occupied the first few pages, with at least one 
page devoted to the events in the Maghrib, and later specifically Algeria; the closer to a 
heated episode the edition was temporally situated, the closer to the front this section 
popped up. The sections of business were next and the leisure sections followed (TV has 
its own page later on). The Parisian roots of Le Monde are especially evident here, as 
shown by the presentation of entertainment events like shows and theater. A last-minute 
news page always concluded each edition.  Finally, throughout the paper, there is 
remarkably less advertising than in Le Figaro.  
 
Le Figaro 
Named after a character of Beaumarchais, Le Figaro came into existence around 
1826, during the relatively repressive years of the Restoration of the French monarchy.   
The original editors, Maurice Alhoy and Etienne Arago, covered various subjects and, 
like succeeding directors, maintained close ties with Parisian literary circles. Although an 
outspoken critic of the reigning monarch, Charles X, the newspaper remained a part of 
the petite presse of Paris, limited in size and scope of coverage. It was only decades later, 
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with the coming of Villemessant in 1854, “l’inventeur incontesté de la presse moderne,”13  
that the Le Figaro began to resemble the modern versions in more than just name 
(Lacretelle 1966: 36). By 1866, the newspaper became an audacious quotidian and broke 
from the petite presse. Again, as during its humble debut, the newspaper took a critical 
stance of the establishment. However, as Lacretelle notes, “on n’est à l’avant-garde 
qu’une fois dans sa vie,” 14 as subsequent moderate positions taken during the popular 
uprisings of 1870-1871 and l’Affaire Dreyfus would demonstrate (42). 
 The “froid et brillant” (cold and brilliant) Pierre Brisson was the preeminent 
figure in the halls of Le Figaro before and after World War II, and all throughout the 
Algerian Revolution (Greilsamer 1990:129).  After cutting production with the Nazis’ 
arrival in the zone libre for fear of being labeled a collaborateur, Brisson eked out a 
single page edition on August 23, 1944.  Characterized as part of the “presse 
d’information,” Lacretelle adds idealistically that “Le Figaro se défend de suivre un parti 
ou un homme.  Sa première règle est de donner à son public une large information … la 
seconde est de juger un gouvernement de ses actes et de barrer la route à l’intolérance 
d’où qu’elle vienne.”15                 
     By contrast, as the Algerian troubles worsened, L’Humanité and others accused Le 
Figaro of leading a campaign for the continuation and augmentation of hostilities in 
Algeria. 
                                                 
13 The incontestable inventor of the modern press. Le Figaro rallied for Captain Dreyfus against anti-
semites. 
14 One is at the avant-garde only once in life. 
15 Le Figaro keeps from following a party or a man.  The first rule of Le Figaro is to inform its 
public…The second is to judge a government by its acts and to bar intolerance, from wherever the 
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Admittedly, Lacretelle, a member of the prestigious Académie Française, is 
probably biased in his overall assessment of Le Figaro; it is difficult to imagine an 
avowed communist penning the same words since Le Figaro had been leery of 
communists for some time. Furthermore, Le Figaro has always “pris grand soin de 
s’entourer des plus grandes signatures littéraires,” with notable proximity to and affinity 
with the Académie Française.16 Nonetheless these quotations illustrate some reasons why 
Le Figaro was chosen for analysis. Le Figaro is indeed a “journal à grande vocation 
littéraire et politique” (a literary and political journal), sympathetic to concerns of the 
liberal bourgeoisie.  Le Figaro’s stance on the Algerian Revolution is likely to differ with 
yet be as respected as Le Monde, in light of their differing backgrounds and philosophies. 
Despite a relative proximity to Le Monde in terms of general content and ideology, HBM 
and Brisson often had heated exchanges in such topics as France’s neutralism as well as 
the Algerian Revolution (Greilsamer 1990). The result and magnitude of difference is 
examined in this study. 
Another motivation to study Le Figaro was the wide circulation it enjoyed. 
Andrews reports a daily circulation of 501,000 was reached in 1958 (1962: 27). A journal 
somewhat more oriented towards the masses than Le Monde (at least in Paris), it is 
probable that there existed a rather significant influence on the thought and opinion of 
French citizens all over France.17  
                                                                                                                                                 
intolerance originates (172).                                                                                                                                             
16 taken great care to attach great literary names to that of the newspaper. 
17 Chatelain reports that three-fourths of the audience was Parisian in 1948 (1962: 10). 
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Also, unlike Le Monde, where the readers were 64% male, Le Figaro found 
greater popularity with females, who were 57% of the readership (Chatelain 1962: 10). 
Le Figaro, though aimed at an educated reader, found 39% of its readers as cadres 
supérieurs (upper class). Le Monde, however, boasted a figure of 50% for the same class, 
although it could be argued that these figures are statistically biased against women, who 
constituted a lesser number of such positions.  
  Another criterion for selection is, of course, that it is of the printed, and thus 
more retrievable, medium. On the whole, the printed press is more tactile, in-depth and 
able to be processed at one’s own pace, and thus can have an influence that goes further 
into and interacts more with the reader’s system of beliefs; the fleeting verbal nature of 
the radio cannot do the same. As for the television, the Algerian Revolution just precedes 
the onset of the Television Revolution.18 Public opinion polls demonstrate the reliance 
people had on the printed media for news during the 1950s.  According to a January 1962 
poll, 78% were reading newspapers at least several times per week (Gallup 1976:  310). 
Finally, described as moderately right of center politically, Le Figaro presents an 
appropriate foil to the more progressive instincts that Le Monde began to develop more 





                                                 





THEORETICAL BASES FOR ANALYSIS AND CODING TECHNIQUE 
                                   
                                    Content Analysis 
  The technique of systematically analyzing data in the mass communications has 
been used to broach a variety of questions; in this study, tools of Content Analysis (CA) 
are used to better understand, via an analysis of the differences between two newspapers, 
a lengthy war and paradoxes in public opinion.  “Mass communications is the traditional 
domain of content analysis” states Krippendorf (1980: 25), and this study belongs to this 
domain. Naturally, CA is a post hoc exercise but can contain implications for future 
action because of a nature that could, depending on the design of the study, approach an 
objective purity. Krippendorf touches on this positivism noting that CA “seeks to 
understand data not as a collection of physical events, but as symbolic phenomena and to 
approach their analysis unobtrusively” (25). As for future guidelines, Tickner observes 
that “words have power, and, therefore, consequences; the way in which policymakers 
and scholars construct reality has an effect on how they act upon and explain that reality” 
(95). This statement is especially pertinent regarding the choice of these two newspapers, 
especially in the case of Le Monde.  
     The printed word has a belief-changing power in itself, but there is also potential 
energy inherent to these ideas that may create a ripple effect through other segments of 
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the population, acting as a sort of “opinion leader.”19A example of the substantial number 
of CA studies was a case where Fico investigates the question of the agenda-setting 
aspect of the media by studying the attention devoted, with different levels of intensity, to 
various subjects.  Again, although the aim of this particular study is not to establish an 
agenda-setting function of the media, Fico’s study would provide credence to my 
assumptions that a correlation exists between mass attitudes and the media. CA also has a 
linguistic nature, something important as I explore the methods of portrayal of the FLN 
and the Pieds-Noirs.  In this respect, Cohn demonstrates, by analyzing the language of 
official government documents, that there is a gendered, sexist nature of politics (Tickner 
2001: 85). CA studies can be described as either quantitatve or qualitative.  Weber notes, 
however, that “The best content analytic studies use both qualitative and quantitative 
operations on tests.  Thus content analysis methods compare what are usually thought to 
be antithetical modes of analysis” (10).  His maxim influenced the design of this study 
which contains both quantitatively and qualitatively collected data. By first establishing 
overall trends by the newspapers, with numbers, the study can show solid evidence over 
time of editorial differences in the newspapers, allowing conclusions to be made about 
the confused ideological landscape of the war.  Then, specific questions about the FLN 
and the Pieds-Noirs can be approached by analyzing specific stories on these subjects in 
each newpspaper.   
                                                 
19 Certainly, “opinion leaders” are reducible and concrete “go-betweens” (Weimann parpaphrasing 
Lazerfield, xi), contrary to the idea of a single mass media influencing an audience directly. But it is 
not altogether unreasonable to say that within the “society” of mass media, in a world where   
individual newspapers are reducible units of a system of information, certain perceptions can be 
biased by the reputation of a newspaper, and thus act as a certain opinion leader at the newsstand. 
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   For the first part of the study, the nature of the questions asked permits a more 
objective, numerical basis of analysis. The second part involves a no less methodical but 
certainly more subjective approach to answering the questions of image portrayal and 
opinion linking, especially through framing.  For the sake of clarity and consistency,  
further explication of the latter is saved until the qualitative section is reached. After a 
discussion on audience perception, the paper outlines some theory leading to an analysis 
in the quantitative section.     
Perception 
 CA fundamentally implies a subject/object relation whereby the object involves 
the individual cognition of the destinataire.20 One aim of the study, as mentioned above, 
is to compare how different newspaper management teams interpret similar events during 
a given spread of years. Another aim of the study is, through the use of theories of human 
cognition and public opinion polls, to better understand and speculate on what 
correlations may exist between the press and its public. Ultimately, these links may form 
the foundations of the media’s agenda-setting ability.21 Of course, it would be unrealistic 
to expect that the beliefs of an entire country would be held hostage to the reporting 
habits of two newspapers.  However, there was considerable respect accorded to these 
                                                 
20 This term is employed by the literary theorist Jakobson to explain the subject/object relation in 
literature by which the writer, the destinateur, creates literature that will be consumed eventually by 
the destinataire or reader.   
21 For this discussion, I rely principally on the work of Jervis, Weimann, Oskamp, Glasser. 
Admittedly, the work on psychological theories of perception and public opinion that was evaluated 
and adapted to my purposes here are not the result of a comprehensive sweep of the literature. Most of 
the concepts used, though, seem to be well accepted in this domain and quite adequate for the analysis 
of the two newspapers and speculation about their effect on the reader. The latter is really my primary 
purpose for entering into this discussion, in order that my assumptions that the press does indeed 
affect the individual are perceived as valid (Fico 1994). 
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newspapers by not only the decision-makers and opinion leaders in France, but also by 
the country as a whole.  If the source is not trusted or disliked, the information offered 
will not be as accepted, and, accordingly, not as apt to influence an individual.  
Additionally, the worldview that an adult carries has been built with years of 
informational input from countless sources, which is a sort of “opinion acquisition.” 
Similar to processes of language acquisition, this “opinion acquisition” reaches a point of 
concretization, whereby further change is prompted only by considerable amount of 
quality information. For this reason, a discussion on the historical significance of the 
Pieds-Noirs is given before the relevant CA, for a certain stereotype had certainly been 
“acquired” by the French vis-à-vis the European settlers.  
Both quality and sufficient quantity information could very conceivably originate 
from both of these newspapers, whose combined readership was reasonably large.  
Questions potentially compromising the legitimacy of this study about the effect of the 
other media such as television and radio naturally follow from this assertion of 
information quality. In response, one can reference the discussion in Chapter III on the 
choice of the newspapers, along with the pertinent polls.  
 In short, information from the radio would probably not be adequate to facilitate 
change in the same way as the newspapers. “Internalization,” as Oskamp describes the 
process of processing and adopting information, could not occur. The process of 
internalization would further explain why it is so difficult for the individual to change.  
Returning to the idea of language acquisition, there is an explicative metaphor which uses 
imagery of internally placed binary “switches,” set by virtue of sufficient input of a given  
 28
language (Radford 1998: 21).22 Likewise, if an “opinion switch” has already been set, 
then there is no longer an option to establish an “opinion primacy” and change thus 
becomes far more difficult, if not impossible—cognitive closure has occurred.  Direct 
personal experience is the “earliest and most direct way to change,” states Oskamp, so 
future change is not out of the question, but is often done in some sort of relation to the 
previous philosophical paradigm the individual had in place.23 Another idea supporting 
the proposal that quality and quantity of information are prerequisite for change is the 
fact that predispositions not only reinforce existing notions but cause a misinterpretation 
of current information; only substantial evidence suggesting the contrary could incite 
change. An Eskimo visiting the southern United States during the lush moments of 
springtime cottonwood trees may first mistake the puffy detritus for snow, if viewed from 
afar.  Dissonance theory, as Oskamp and Jervis explain, suggests that change must 
eventually occur with continued information as such because an individual instinctively 
wishes to enjoy ontological security (and maintain consistency), and information putting 
this in question will eventually have to be considered.                
 Finally, it is altogether possible that the information will simply be ignored to 
avoid dissonance and thus maintain internal consistency. In this case, the contrary 
information either lacks the necessary duration, quantity, or quality to be effective; the 
                                                 
22 This model refers to the principle-and-parameters theory (PPT) whereby an innate grammatical 
ability is present cognitively in every normally functioning human being. According to the PPT, once 
sufficient input is introduced to specific regions of the brain dealing with grammar processing, the 
grammatical structure of a language is learned. Cognitive closure follows, rendering this process 
difficult to repeat past a certain point in time. 
23 Change under these conditions involves what Oskamp terms “value-expressive attitudes,” which, in 
a hierarchy of different sorts of opinions hold the most onerous conditions that change would 
necessitate. The description of this category of opinions approximates the ideas. 
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source may also be mistrusted and the end result is that the new information glances off 
the encased attitude of the individual, like a flimsy arrow against a thick castle wall. Or, 
as in the case Francine Dessaigne and others in Algeria, who in the daily struggle have 
become numb to the big picture: “La guerre n’est pas trop présente…nous y sommes 
tellement habitués que nous n’y faisons plus attention” (1972: 9).24 
To employ a theoretical mathematical analogy with the above discussion on 
perception and information in mind, there are two rough possibilities concerning change 
that could be posited. Consider “I” as the information-time coefficient (information given 
over time: i/t) with arbitrary values, where new information accepted must outpace the 
time elapsed to remain greater than 1. Attitude change would then occur in a situation 
that is greater than 1, and no change would be the case if the situation nets a number less 
than 1.  As explained in the conclusion and seen below, the “I” equation can work against 
itself on multiple levels.25     
 
          I<1; or 
           I is not sufficient to raise the original attitude to a different level 
           I >1 
            where I is sufficient to raise the attitude to a different level.   
 
To summarize this point, which is of capital importance to the thesis: new 
information must be of sufficient quality and quantity (over time) in order for opinion 
change to occur.  
                                                 
24 The war is only too present in ourselves, so much so that we are desensitized to its effects. 
25 Determining an exact method for calculating I is not the purpose here; the equations are merely an 






Scholars have problematized extensively the meaning of “public opinion,” in the 
end agreeing only on the fact that that no commonly accepted definition is held (Glasser 
1995: 15).  Obviously this is not a fracas that needs to be entered at this point, so suffice 
it to say that Glasser’s observation that “public opinion has been used to refer to opinions 
affecting and being influenced in the public arena by major social and political 
institutions” describes the “artifact” indicative of public opinion that is used in this study: 
the Gallup International Polls (17).  
 Public opinion polls have reached a sort of cult status, at least in American 
society, gauging everything from political issues like presidential preference, to social 
issues like reproductive rights, to the seemingly mundane such as public fashion approval 
for movie stars. But what real effect do these indices have on decision makers? Agenda-
setting by the media has been demonstrated, but the precise conditions under which this 
occurs, and the causal pathways (via the public) are territories for future research.  Most 
elected decision makers, it seems, do not worry about unfavorable public opinion (in 
certain subjects) because they believe that: 1) opinion is prone to change with the wind, 
2) they themselves can change opinion because of superior information or press 
manipulation ability that they might have in regards to a particular issue, or 3) the time 
needed for change is often significant. These are all probably reasons why de Gaulle 
acted so ambiguously at times concerning the Algerian issue.   
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Furthermore, the indices of public opinion, as much as they may measure the 
sentiments of a constituency, may not necessarily alarm the decision maker simply 
because many of these individuals are not politically active or effective. Indeed, as 
Glasser notes, like-membered groups tend to generate in response to a certain issue, a 
phenomenon that facilitates societal change.  Other than somewhat fringe groups such as 
the communists behind L’Humanité, or intellectuals such as de Beauvoir, too few 
effective groups formed to demand innovative solutions to the Algerian conflict, even if 
considerable portions of the public opinion, at different times, would have been amenable 
to such change.26 Jervis notes the importance of personal risk to affecting change and 
action, and for much of the war, personal risk did not enter into the minds of many 
French citizens to the same extent as the Pieds-Noirs and ultras (1976: 266). This lack of 
personal risk undoubtedly prolonged the war and partly explains the protracted nature of 
the conflict in Vietnam that the Americans later undertook.  
During the Algerian Revolution, public opinion polls show that the conflict rated 
high among the people’s concerns (see Appendix B).  Ministers, presidents and prime 
ministers, and indeed the Fourth Republic fell victim to the people’s desires because of 
the war. Time was needed before the concept of independence was to be supported.  The 
idea of independence was indeed complicated by the long, shared history between the 
nations.  Since both individuals and governments can be “more concerned with reaching 
a goal than with the methods whereby a goal is reached” it is not logical that the 
                                                 
26 An October 1959 poll shows that respondents no longer feel strongly about the idea of a French 
Algeria, yet a reluctance to renounce control remained evident. 
 
 32
government, primarily reactive to the wish of the people at this point, as shown by de 
Gaulle’s rise, would try innovative approaches (Gallup vii). Only when the war came to 
the Metropole, and the sense of personal risk increased, did opinion show a marked 
upswing as to the concerns of the people vis-à-vis Algeria, and more innovative 
approaches, such as the vote for self-determination in Algeria, were pursued in earnest. 
What interests me most are paradoxes that were discovered in public opinion concerning 
two groups, both closest to the conflict and often furthest from each other ideologically: 
the Pieds-Noirs and the FLN.  Neither found a favorable French audience, and the one 
most proximal to the more militarily powerful Metropole vanished from Algeria, while 
the other, the FLN, eventually ascended into the political mainstream in Algeria.  After 
discussing the methodology and tools used in this study, such tools will be applied to 
analyzing these paradoxes.        
Codes 
The concept of codes is important in this study. The process of coding resembles 
the digitization of information by computers. The raw information that a computer 
processes is in fact already encoded through language, the latter being the premier and 
enigmatic code of the human intellect. Rendering this data into binary digits, the 
computer encodes the raw information into manageable units.  In the same way, the 
media (as a primary decoder/secondary encoder) draw from and make sense of the 
linguistically encoded discourse flooding the human perception. The primary decoder, a 
destinataire, then becomes the secondary encoder as the information is filtered and 
communicated to the attentive public (see Figure I). Of course, the information has 
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probably undergone multiple times the encoding/decoding process, which can affect the 
quality of information in terms of trueness to the original source, but for the purposes 
here, the model will be kept basic. The content analyzer then attempts, per research 
questions, to bring this information back to a more simplified, numeric form. Here we 
encounter the signifié27 encoded, the well of meaning we are trying to tap, for the 
quantitative rendering allows us to posit certain impressions the information might make 
on the destinataire. If conditions for change are satisfied, then the information is then 
encoded in the memory of the destinataire; otherwise, as Jervis would support, the 
information vaporizes and is lost. Also, conscious and unconscious elements of the 
encoders’ psyche (political leanings, etc.—the signifié) can be ascertained, especially 




Figure I Coding Scheme 
Encoded information in primary environment primary decoder (journalist or some other destinataire) secondary 
encoder (not necessarily same journalist) secondary decoder (public) 
Coding for this study 
      These categories and rules were designed to allow a certain precision and 
accuracy in unearthing the signifié, while maintaining a somewhat broad delineation 
within the categories, so as to avoid the methodological problems that might follow from 
over-specificity.  As aforementioned, the front-page material was the focus of the coding 
process. Previous studies treated the sole factor of front-page space dedicated to the 
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27 French Structuralist criticism speaks of the signifié, the internal, raw uncoded meaning, and the 
signifiant, the outer indices of the signifié, such as language. 
subject in question.28 Categories were added in order to test and devise a system that 
weights the various aspects of transmittance techniques by the press.  In analyzing change 
in perception, factors influencing perception should be taken into account.  The point-
system that was designed seems to depict a more accurate landscape of features that have 
the potential to affect perception.  Rendering two stylistically different newspapers more 
comparable with the point system allows the study to posit equal (or nearly equal) effects 
on the reader.  This is paramount to concluding that the press signals in France during the 
Algerian Revolution were so mixed that the result was inordinately slow opinion change. 
 Another difference of method, as opposed to Andrews, who used all the days in a 
five-month period, the sampling unit was randomly picked.  In all, seven days from each 
month were chosen, spanning the odd years from 1955-1963 (N= approximately 840).29 
Since the conflict erupted with the November 1, 1954 attacks, the measurements were 
begun in 1955, the first whole year. The official conclusion of the Revolution took place 
over the course of 1962, which hearkened the beginning of a still tenuous political system 
in Algeria.  The analysis was extended one more year to analyze the effect on the output 
of stories.   
Points were given on the merits of separate contribution of each category (see 
below criteria). Five categories or recording units were devised. While it is true that more 
could be distinguished, it was found that these five were separate enough to avoid the 
                                                 
28 Epstein and Segal use the front-page material as establishing hierarchy of issue salience in relation 
to overall content of the newspaper (2000). Miller et al. also use the front-page as indicator (1979). 
29 Like Andrews, all stories pertaining to the conflict were mesaured, as indicated by evidence in the 
titles. The general  trends he found with the newspapers that he analyzed (L’Humanité, France-Soir, 
Le Monde) were the same as what was found in Le Monde and Le Figaro. 
 
 35
over-specificity criterion, yet powerful enough to work in concert, shading the reader’s 
perception.  The categories included are distinguished by questions concerning: 
1) Title/subtitle: An actor in the Revolution (i.e. Ben Bella or General Salan), an 
Algerian place (i.e. Algiers or Algeria itself), or organization (i.e. the FLN, or the 
OAS) connected to the Revolution. To be precise, it must be added that if this 
criterion was not filled, then no points were applied, which of course affected the 
overall average score. A further necessity for weighting the articles’ salience on 
the basis of these categories is that weighting an article for the amount of material 
that it would contain regarding the Algerian Revolution would become too 
subjective, complicated, and time-consuming.   
2) Advertisement space: Generally, one or two advertisements are contained on the 
front-page. This is considered non-news space and therefore irrelevant to 
perceptions and opinions that might be affected based on the content of the front 
page. The total column space taken by the advertisement is subtracted when 
taking into account the percentage of front-page space that the relevant Algerian 
column occupies. 
3) Column Space: This category is rather straightforward; space devoted to both the 
column and title was measured and figured as a percentage of the total front-page 
surface. Four levels are used, the points commensurate with the level number.   
4) Font size (title): This element is important since an article with a large, projecting 
font may have less column space than another article with smaller font in the title. 
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Since human perception involves a process of simplification, and a projecting title 
may offer this option without the onerous task of reading every article, this 
category was weighted with the same number of possible points as category #3.        
A fifth recording unit (or sampling unit, owing to its separate treatment) is analyzed free 
from the above-mentioned connected categories and point system: 
5) Level of focus: Depending on who the subjects presented in the title are (and thus 
what the subject of the article was) three different values differentiating actors 
involved were assigned, an aspect I hypothesize can be important in 
differentiating coverage between the two newspapers. Using a diagram of 





                                                  Figure II 
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The outer, third party circle is mainly concerned with actors in the diplomatic 
scene such as the United Nations, Tunisia (through President Bourguiba), and less often, 
the United States and the Soviet Union. Stories reported concerning such an actor was 
given the rating of 3, expressing a more remote quality of the reported action, in relation 
to the conflict itself.  Any action resting within circle two received a rating of 2. Action in 
Algeria, even for reports of domestic elections, is considered at level 2. These reports 
often depicted Muslim-Algerian absenteeism at the polls, in protest against French 
policies, but this form of protest did not manifest itself violently or cause social unrest as 
strikes often do. Editorial, fully opinionated stories received the rating of 2. Strikes and 
other such action (including violence) close to “ground-zero” in Algeria (and later 
France) were designated with the 1 rating. French internecine violence (especially 
concerning the OAS) and likewise FLN-MNA frays received the rating of 1. These 
designations are meant to show where the two newspapers differed in terms of the 
intensity of conflict portrayed.  Additionally, one can discern qualitatively how “first-
order” or “second-order” a media outlet may be; that is, what kind of self-conscious 
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CHAPTER V: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES 
 
FRONT-PAGE COVERAGE PERCENTAGE 
 
From a simple glance of Le Monde, it is obvious that, compared to Le Figaro 
(which preferred more boasting titles and photos) there are significantly more words on 
the page and less photographs (if ever). So it may not be surprising that Le Monde 
enjoyed a superiority in terms of raw space of coverage throughout the period studied. 
This is the reason why the perception index was instituted.  As shown by figure IV, an 
interesting phenomenon is noted: the rises and dips of one newspaper’s Algerian 
coverage from year to year remained roughly identical to the other, despite stylistic 
differences in usage of front-page space.  A follow-up study on this phenomenon might 
measure more extreme newspapers to see how closely the editors’ selection of events to 
report resembles each other. 
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Figure IV












       
 
The dynamic of the coverage is probably as such for several reasons.  The dip 
between 1957 and 1959 can be explained in part by the increasing importance of 
domestic issues, especially questions relating to economic conditions in France (see 
Appendix B). Other domestic events, although related to the Algerian problem, also 
competed for space on the front-page. De Gaulle’s second ascension to power, along with 
the birth of the Fifth Republic, took precedence for some time, at least until events heated 
up again. Additionally, the overarching influence that de Gaulle projected as one of the 
great statesman of the 20th century even extended to the Muslims of Algeria.  The 
reconciliatory speech “Je vous ai compris” (I understand you) as well as his “Paix des 
braves,” (Gentlemen’s Peace) was aimed to convince all parties of the counterproductive 
and destructive nature of fighting. His speeches also worked to keep the violent activities 
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of the politically minded FLN at bay for some time.  Additionally, de Gaulle purged the 
army of elements suspected of not being loyal and General Maurice Challe instituted a 
modern and targeted offensive in which the FLN was weakened further, in terms of 
materials and popular support.  The army, mostly reverent of de Gaulle, and the state both 
lived a period of rapprochement.  So on the whole, the situation was somewhat in 
control, stable and predictable, with fewer gruesome events that marked previous years.  
Coverage thus dropped.  Only with the rise in tensions after the period of quiet did 
coverage shoot up. 
The sense of urgency that the public felt for the Algerian war, as indicated by the 
Gallup polls, followed the trends of coverage. The opinion and coverage trends can be 
best understood in terms of the above-presented information/time constraint. The lesser 
amount of information circulating during the 1957-1959 years would have made the 
conflict seem less pressing to the French public, and therefore worry dropped. However, 
as the coverage shot up, so did the polls, as is evident in Appendix B. What changes are 
the “value-expressive attitudes” that the French held, as sufficient information is given 
over time.    
 
Perception Index 
As stated above, in order to facilitate a comparison of two stylistically different 
newspapers, three visual aspects of each story were weighted, each comprising one-third 
of the index value. In order to draw conclusions about the ideological landscape during 
the war as presented by Le Monde and Le Figaro, it must be shown that the potential 
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power to affect a reader’s perception is similar between the two newspapers. These 
numbers were averaged by seven (seven days each month were selected) after compiling 
each monthly calculation for the 120 months measured. The effect on each newspaper 
was to bring each percentage/numerical figure down, although this drop was more 































Thus, as shown by figure VII, the perceptions of the newspapers were essentially 
equalized, both enjoying at times a slight advantage. This of course was not a principal 
intention in formulating the perception index.  As emphasized above, facilitating a 
comparison between two unlike newspapers was the intended effect.  In order to try to 
avoid circular reasoning, this is the basic conclusion that can be drawn from the exercise 
of attaching values to the perception potential of an article: despite greater figures of 
percentage, Le Figaro, through other means of attention-getting, managed to maximize 
its use of front-page space directed to the average, less-than-attentive reader.  This index, 
of course, necessitates a test in the laboratory, with real readers. Today, however the use 
of the index for the printed media would be limited because of the greater pertinence of 






















Levels of Presentation 
 This category of analysis also yielded intriguing data. Like the percentage 
similarity, the level 1 designations followed a similar pattern between the newspapers, 
with level 2 and level 3 following this pattern to a lesser extent (see figures VIII, IX, and 
X). The lack of interest and confidence is reflected in polls on the United Nations (see 
Appendix B). Thus both responded most similarly to hard events. The difference though, 
lies in what other stories accompanied the reports of first-order nature. For the most part, 
category 2 tended to collect the most stories for both newspapers (65.5% for Le Monde 
and 48.5% for Le Figaro overall). Level 1, as shown in both figures VIII and XI, was 
greater in Le Figaro than in Le Monde, whereas Le Monde favored category 2 more than 
its counterpart (compare figures VIII and IX). This is in large part due to the more 
significant number of editorials that one found on the front page, which became more and 
more critical of France’s actions in Algeria over the course of the conflict. Level 3 
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jumped in 1963 for Le Figaro due to greater coverage of incidents in the Maghrib, such 
as the friction between Morocco and Algeria.   
 What this suggests is that Le Monde, a newspaper more written for the literati, can 
be differentiated in terms of proximity to the conflict. Similar trends in both newspapers 
in space devoted to war coverage demonstrates like overall reaction to related events. In 
Le Monde, however, this is accompanied by a sort of discourse that is less present in Le 
Figaro. This latter paper concentrates more on the proximal events of level 1 nature. One 
might go as far as to say that this aspect might be a reason and/or indicator why it became 
a more left-leaning newspaper than in the pre-war years, as such dialogue is often 
characteristic of more progressive media sources.  Later, a qualitative comparison will be 
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On average, as is evident by figures XI and XII, level 1 events are nearly twice as 
evident in Le Figaro in relation to the proportion of level 1 events in Le Monde: 42.5% 
vs. 21.5% respectively. This highlights a major factor of coverage difference and perhaps 
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why Le Monde is intuitively considered as the newspaper of the educated, focused less on 
first-order issues and more on the gray areas that characterize the complexity of not only 



































TOWARDS QUALITATIVE ANALYSES: 
 FRAMING30 
 
As the journalists and editors re-code the information gleaned from reality, 
decisions are made as to the overall spin that a story will present to the reader. This 
process is known as framing, and a systematic approach to studying framing can yield 
insight about the true or apparent intentions of the management. Often, an organizational 
philosophy is already known, and few would be surprised about the partisan and 
outspoken coverage that the communist newspaper L’Humanité gave during the Algerian 
Revolution. However, specific aspects of framing can lead to a better understanding of 
what perception the reader may have formed after reading a story.  This in turn may have 
aggregating effects on public opinion.  Furthermore, one can observe, through this 
approach to content analysis, the specific philosophical shifts that the management of the 
newspaper may have undergone over the life-cycle of a compelling issue.  
Related to the concept of framing, an issue undergoes a process of what Anthony 
Downs calls the issue-attention cycle (1972: 38). He enumerates several stages of 
development of a specific topic.  The first stage in the cycle is the pre-problem stage, 
when the problem is probably already present, but the public knows little of it.  At this 
stage, the issue jockeys for distinction from other issues, competing for the limited space 
                                                 
30 Shanto Iyengar explores this concept as it relates to politicians ascribing blame in the media, and 
how the media thus presents or “frames” the politicians’ rhetoric. 
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on the front page.  Questions, for example, relating to the status of sovereignty of other 
states in the Maghrib often pushed dialogue about and events in Algeria off the front page 
in the early stages of the conflict.  As the conflict subsided at certain points (e.g., after 
1957), one notices a drop in the front-page percentage dedicated to Algeria.  This occurs 
until an increase in level 1 events in 1961 brought more attention to the Revolution.  Both 
newspapers show decrease in level 1 percentage from 1957-1959, but an increase from 
1959-1961, suggesting that level 1 reporting is a determining feature for overall coverage. 
The ensuing stage is that of alarmed discovery by the media and constituency. In 
1955, it took episodic, level 1 type events until a thematic story was published (see below 
for episodic/thematic distinction).  Third is the moment of cost realization (what it would 
take to quickly remediate the dilemma). Throughout the stories, the true, irreconcilable 
nature of the FLN, went unrecognized as various reforms short of independence failed, 
one by one.  Lastly, one observes the decline and post-problem stages of the cycle. In 
these final stages, mention by the press of the issue deescalates to the point or to the near 
point of nonexistence; already, by 1963, levels of coverage on Algeria dropped below the 
levels of 1955. The steepness of the drop in Algerian coverage is interesting, even if a 
drop would be expected.     
This cycle is especially evident when there is clearly a David suffering in a 
David-Goliath dyad, since the press often projects that “the elite’s environmental 
deterioration is the common man’s improved standard of living” (Downs 1972: 37).  This 
presents unique problems to the stability of a reader’s worldview when the population 
from which the reader hails, in a sense, is the “elite” in relation to another people.  This 
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was, it can be argued, the case between the French and the Algerians during the 
Revolution. With de jure and de facto control over both native Algerians and the Pieds-
Noirs, it is evident that  Paris possessed substantial power in having the final word over 
Algiers. Similarly, in the Congo, between the 19th and 20th centuries, the exploitation 
effected by the Belgian King Leopold II against the native people was slowed and 
stopped only by movements in the press.  In effect, the press was able to diffuse pictures 
and stories of this colonial subjugation to American and British publics, thereby enraging 
public opinion.31 
An issue regarded in the macro can contain micro-levels. Many events and 
debates that so permeated the press during the conflict in Algeria can be studied as such; 
the question of l’Algérie française (French Algeria) is one such example. On the macro-
level, the conflict itself could be treated as an issue, and the numbers for front-page 
attention devoted to the issue would mostly confirm this.  Certainly a broader analysis 
including more years would yield stronger results, but trends can be investigated 
nonetheless. Though the coverage in 1955 was sparse, the conflict was indeed in full 
swing as clashes regularly resulted in casualties.  Similarly, the coverage after 1962 
dropped immensely as Algeria began to be treated as an external element to French 
society, with many micro-issues such as the FLN terrorism and the pied-noir predicament 
having dissipated.  The focus was more on Ben Bella and his government, and the press 
presented Algerian struggles, such as the conflict with Morocco, as ultimately problems 
for Algerian policymakers.  
                                                 
31 See Adam Hochschild’s King Leopold’s Ghost. 
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      Iyengar analyzed the framing of network news broadcasts using methods that 
can be adapted to the study of printed press media as well.  Since most viewers have 
neither the means nor the desire to perform further research on every topic presented, a 
certain cognitive economy can be posited to exist. This can go one of two ways: either 
the destinataire will ignore information if counter to her beliefs, or he or she will change 
his or her perception.  Since the Algerian conflict was of such a protracted nature, 
demonstrating modifications in opinions and policy throughout, it is assumed that the 
framing of the particular articles that are analyzed could affect individual perception of 
certain features of the conflict. This potential for change must be assumed because 
otherwise there would be no point to analyzing the framing of an event or issue in light of 
changing public sentiment.     
  A feature of framing that Iyengar introduces is episodic presentation. Through 
this aspect of framing, a specific instance is depicted, often the story or individual 
account of a witness or expert regarding a particular event. Episodic framing “breeds 
individual rather than societal attributions of responsibility…[protecting] elected officials 
from policy failures” (Iyengar 1994: 62).  Additionally, portrayal of tense conflict 
through a concrete framing of facts has been shown to provoke the greatest reaction from 
the destinataire (Wanta and Hu 1993). Oskamp notes that there is deeper comprehension 
of a story when the moral is stated explicitly.  By contrast, thematic framing involves, for 
example, interviews or accounts that point to a particular theme, rather than 
corresponding to a single event.  For the most part, thematic framing is more moderately 
presented than episodic framing but does not necessarily have to present a lesser interest 
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on the part of an editor to see a policy changed or put in place. This is so because 
thematic framing could just as well be the cumulative result of previous episodic stories, 
providing an interior forum of reflection on a contemporary plight. These categories were 
analyzed quantitatively, although it can just as well be used for qualitative differentiation. 
 
Thematic vs. Episodic 
Comparing the thematic and episodic stories of each newspaper presents another 
angle of comparison, similar to the levels of analysis, but different in the sense that level 
2 stories could be classified as either thematic or episodic. In this way, a precision can be 
made as to the extent to which a dialogue was fostered by each paper, above and beyond 
the quotidian reporting of events. Overall, Le Monde favored slightly thematic reporting 
(51.5%) while Le Figaro favored episodic stories (60%). As shown by figures XIII and 
XIV, except for a drop in Le Monde from 1955-1957, the newspapers hold to their 
preferences throughout the period of Revolution. 
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Figure XIII  































 The result of this difference between the newspapers shows the extent to 
which the Intellegentsia reputation of Le Monde is manifested in the course of the war.  
With thematic coverage, more abstract and general questions as to the grand question of 
the war were explored, unlike what is observed in the majority of coverage in Le Figaro. 
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The latter newspaper chose to focus on the day-to-day clashes, focusing primarily on the 
tit-for-tat nature of the conflict, without a general questioning of military involvement 
consistently led by the editors.  A definitive landscape of the war, incorporating both 
ideological dialogue as well as basic reflective journalistic coverage could never then be 
attained.  The information requirement for the destinataire to effect a change in opinion 
was then not sufficient, as analyzed through this technique of thematic vs. episodic 
coverage.   
 
Framing: Level 1 and Level 3 Comparison 
 Le Figaro, through its inclinations towards episodic and level 1 stories, is 
undoubtedly quite action oriented. This is exacerbated by the fact that accompanying the 
headlines, almost without fail, the reader immediately spies the quantified damage done 
with numbers of casualties listed.  Contrasting with Le Monde, which listed such items 
less often in the headlines and indeed had less level 1 stories, this feature is yet another 
distinction between the coverage styles of the two papers.  Another difference in level 1 
stories is that a general Us/Them sense of justice seems to persist much longer than in Le 
Monde. By this, it is meant that though both newspapers used language for some time 
that imbued the Algerian fighters with pariah status. Terms such as rebelles (rebels) and 
hors-la-loi (outlaws) were often used. But even as early as 1955, Le Monde, as shown by 
a story about the woes of both an Algerian and a Pied-Noir, was balancing stories about 
the victims of violence from both sides (October 16, 1955).  
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Iyengar distinguishes between stories of a causal nature and those of a treatment 
nature, the former focusing on who or what provoked the events while the latter is more 
second-order oriented, focusing on measures of alleviation or prevention for the problem. 
This is a useful tool of distinction in analyzing these newspapers. In 1959, Le Monde 
began reporting the violence of the ultras and accounts from the Algerian side, something 
Le Figaro never fully caught on to. Stories (of a treatment nature) in Le Figaro that claim 
the Algerian people as the sole interlocuteur valable (legitimate negotiator) were written 
more in a spirit of opposition to the FLN’s status as negotiating party than anything else. 
Causal responsibility of the assassination of the mayor of Evian during peace talks there 
in 1959 and ensuing violence was explicitly directed towards the ultras in Le Monde, 
whereas Le Figaro made no such mention of a connection.  Finally, causal responsibility 
was often clear in the headlines of Le Figaro when an FLN attack occurred, but later, as 
activities of activists caused bloodshed (especially from 1961 on), little connection to 
causal responsibility was made in the headlines.  Words like plastiqué or plastiquers are 
the sole signals of activiste malfeasance. Le Monde largely avoided this by limiting 
attributions to causal responsibility in the headlines. Neither paper, though, had sympathy 
for the OAS in late 1961, as is reflected by the fact that both papers attributed causal 
responsibility to the exploits of that organization. Thus, one can begin to see that, with a 
closer glance to these level 1 articles, more differences in potential perception shift (or 
lack thereof) can be observed. Indeed ambiguously different signals are observed from 
two press outlets hailing from somewhat similar, mainstream ideologies.  The quality of 
information diffused over time was inadequate for opinion change. 
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The articles from level 3 are less numerous, but several interesting details can be 
pointed out.  First off, both newspapers were decidedly hostile to most forms of foreign 
intervention and interest in Algeria, especially vis-à-vis the United Nations, although Le 
Figaro employed more militant language—demi-rupture and riposte, highlighting the 
more intense attitude that Le Figaro harbored towards the U.N. Indeed, a Gallup poll 
from July 1957 shows only 18% of the respondents believing that France should follow 
the counsel given by the U.N. (see Appendix C). The overtures of President Bourguiba of 
Tunisia, as well as the royal family in Morocco, were also portrayed by Le Figaro as less 
helpful in abating the conflict, by contrast to the more objective presentation of Le 
Monde. In 1958, a mere 15% of respondents to a poll believed that France should act with 
Bourguiba in resolving the conflict (Gallup 1976: 238). Le Figaro, more negative to such 
concerted efforts, shows steeper decline in the level 3 category, while Le Monde persisted 
a bit more with level 3 stories.  It is not mere chance, then, that in 1961, those trusting 
Bourguiba completely or partially were a more substantial 48%, while those trusting him 
only a little or not at all numbered around 30% (293).  Overtures were certainly 
occurring, even if Le Figaro chose to ascribe a lesser importance to such events, so it was 
probably through the constant flow of information from such press “opinion leaders” as 







                                   
                  OTHER QUALITATIVE ANALYSES: PIED-NOIRS AND THE FLN 
 
Analyzing the portrayal and change in portrayal of the European population in 
Algeria and the FLN will add some insight into certain aspects of Metropolitan public 
perception vis-à-vis both populations.  First, an analysis of the settled Europeans will be 
given. Next, there is a brief introduction of the FLN, which took time for the press to 
even recognize as an entity to be reckoned with.  This section concludes with analyses 
from the two newspapers regarding these subjects.  
 
The Predicament of the Pieds-Noirs 
“La masse nous ignora, ou pire, continua de nous enfermer dans le ghetto des 
étiquettes si nous étions les ‘colons, les petits blancs.’”  (Dessaigne 1972: iii)  
Most ignored us, or worse, they continued to shut us into the ghetto of labels so 
that we were the ‘colonists,’ or the ‘little whites.’ 
First to be explored is a question regarding a population involuntarily placed with 
one foot planted on either side of the steaming fault lines of two, irreconcilable worlds: 
between that of the Metropolitan French, and that of Algerians awakening from decades 
of unequal treatment by the authorities and settlers.  While analyzing the opinion polls 
administered by Gallup during the war years, an interesting phenomenon becomes 
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apparent: precious little sympathy is observed on the part of the Metropolitan French 
regarding the Pieds-Noir population in Algeria. 
In May 1959, for example, about the same number of Metropolitan French felt a 
sense of responsibility towards the French in Algeria, with nearly one quarter of 
respondents having no opinion.  These sentiments continued into August 1961 when the 
overwhelming majority of respondents in the Hexagone (69%) stated that, if the Pieds-
Noirs were expelled, then they would have no intention of helping them out.  Over half 
felt no allegiance to the European population in Algeria (April 1962) and many felt, 
according to a poll led one month previous to the latter, that Europeans could still live 
there if independence came to pass (43% out of 69% responding, Gallup 308). Clearly, 
respondents held the notion that satisfactory conditions would be present in the case of 
Algerian independence. Furthermore, a large number of French also believed that French 
ties to Algeria would be closer and more secure than they were in the years following the 
conflict (260). This is so despite the fact that very few believed, as early as 1959, that a 
French Algeria would be possible or even desirable, and that sooner or later 
independence for Algeria was imminent (43% versus 36%, 250).   
The conclusions to be drawn are that, first, not only were physical barriers 
separating these populations, but an ideological gulf was present as well; second, the 
French were not worried about possible fallout of losing the war after having won battles, 
and thus avoided worrying themselves (to dodge cognitive dissonance) about various 
scenarios ultimately detrimental to the Pied-Noir way of life in the Maghrib.  Otherwise 
stated, recognizing Algerian independence would be a pre-requisite for considering what 
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must be done for the Pieds-Noirs.  It must be added that the newspaper was one of the 
few media connecting and thus educating the Metropole on aspects of the life of Pieds-
Noirs in Algeria.  Therefore, it can be hypothesized that there should be a dearth of 
information on worst-case scenarios (for the Pieds-Noirs).  Consequently one could 
surmise that would be a domination of information buttressing Pied-Noir stereotypes and 
assumptions about the continuation of their presence in Algeria.  Such stereotypes and 
assumptions would be the result of a need to maintain cognitive assonance in light of the 
military activities of the government in Algeria.   
Of course, to undertake a comprehensive sweep of all the newspaper articles 
dealing with such subjects would not be feasible methodology, so the study will remain 
faithful to the above argument on using the front-page stories to glean such qualitative 
information.  Furthermore, the paper has neglected, to this point, historical features that 
also play a role in the Metropolitan perception of its emigrated kinfolk.  With a people so 
long implanted in the Maghrib, it is inevitable that there were perceptions formed 
previous to the 1954 Revolution.  The caveat is then proposed that what is shown with 
newspaper content analysis is information that reinforces rather than creates stereotypes.  
Before proceeding to this evidence, though, the reasons for the diminutive views of the 






Rejection and Roots: the Pied-Noir in Search of a New Beginning 
 
There are few texts dedicated solely to the history of the Pieds-Noirs, probably 
because their existence was not even fully etymologically recognized until the struggles 
for independence in North Africa.  The phrase, originally pejorative (literally meaning 
“black foot,” referring to the black shoes against the light-colored traditional maghribine 
dress), debuted in France around 1955 when the first waves of immigrants arrived from 
the Maghrib (Pichot).  Before the Revolution, a cultural self-consciousness had yet to be 
formed, at least to the same extent that was apparent during and after the Revolution.  
The French had been officially colonizing there since 1830, so longstanding communities 
were certainly in place.  But prior to the Revolution, with the extreme inequities in 
education, hiring and wage practices, one cannot posit that differences were not at least 
sensed unconsciously. Unlike the institution of segregation that plagued the American 
South for so long, though, “segregation” in Algeria was not a fixed, explicit institution. 
But socioeconomic and cultural differences were obvious to all inhabitants of Algeria. 
And such differences, when mixed with social unrest, often contribute to an ethnic 
awareness and imbalance that fractionalizes whole societies.32 The problem was, as we 
see in the press, the French society that thought itself as indivisible could not heal itself 
as a whole, because it was never really whole to begin with.  
                                                 
32 In Rwanda, the Belgian colonial powers essentially institutionalized the Hutus and Tutsi ethnic 
divisions which was perhaps the genesis of the tragically concluded conflict in 1994.  Another 
example of social awareness provoking change against exploitation is found in the chaotic moments of 
desegregation in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s.    
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Indeed, the historical record implies a strong probability that the Pieds-Noirs were 
not simply a group perceived as being composed of mainstream, metropolitan elements 
abroad.  Often times, the Maghrib served as the receptacle for excess labor during periods 
of economic hardship in Europe, for exiled political enemies, and finally for those 
seeking freedom of religious conscience.33 Certain religious and governmental figures 
even contemplated sending orphaned children to eventually serve as a source of labor, an 
idea which actually can be traced to an Edit royal in 1670 (Merien 1998: 430).  
Therefore, one can easily remark that, like many socioeconomically deprived people, 
these unwanted elements sent to Algeria probably influenced negatively the stereotype 
the Metropolitan French carried of the Pied-Noir. These individuals were sent as labor 
and often worked alongside the autochthonous people, which additionally contributed to 
a more integrated, though no more just, society than what existed in the American South. 
Indeed many of the entrepreneurial minded also emigrated to Algeria on their own free 
will and carved out a lush existence from not only their own hard work, but additionally 
through exploitation of the native land and population; often the French government 
seized communal lands thus contributing to the pauperization of many Algerians 
(Bennoune 1988).  
Eventually, in the course of the conflict, according to one Pied-Noir, “En 
Métropole, seuls quelques amis nous ont ouvert les bras” (Dessaigne 1972: ii).34 The 
                                                 
33 At times, the protestants at least equaled those Catholics among European immigrants in Algeria. 
Also, Pichot’s family fits in all three categories of immigrants. After the ateliers nationaux closed 
subsequent to the 1848 imbroglios, his ancestor included an out-of-work young protestant wife who, 
among other things, was exiled for smashing chairs over the heads of national guardsmen. 
34 In the Métropole, only a few friends opened their arms to us. 
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opinion polls reinforce such a sentiment as probably being representative of countless 
cases.  Dessaigne continues: “nous sommes trop souvent douleureusement surpris par 
l’indifférence des Métropolitains.”35  In conclusion, the root of this disconnect with the 
European world is historically socioeconomic, with the Algerian Revolution only 
bringing to greater prominence the predicament of the Pied-Noir, and reinforcing 
stereotypes. Now the study will examine empirical data to see how this hypothesis bears 
out.         
 
Analysis 
“Pourquoi l’enfant de Paris a-t-elle droit au gros titre aux photos au long article 
alors que les journaux n’accordent que quelques lignes discrètes aux nôtres qu’on 
assassine depuis sept ans,” wrote Dessaigne in her diary in 1961 (146).36 It is 
unsurprising that the Metropolitan newspapers covered atrocities in France at times more 
fervently than events in Algeria, for reasons of proximity.  Nevertheless, the space 
dedicated to both Pieds-Noirs and ultras was astonishingly slim, considering that Algeria 
was regarded as French by most of the French people prior to the conflict.   
Consequently, the fate of the European Algerians was not frequently mentioned in 
the beginning years of the Revolution because the fact of a forced withdrawal did not 
become a reality in the minds of many French and politicians until the closing months of 
the conflict. In a sense, the fate of the Pieds-Noirs was intertwined with the fact of 
                                                 
35 We are too often surprised by the indifference of the Métropole French. 
36 Why does the Parisian child have the right to big articles and photos in the newspapers, while our 
murdered children are given but a few discrete lines? 
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Algerian independence, and without a serious consideration of the latter, the former 
would remain inactive, like otherwise inert chemicals mixing with each other to produce 
a reaction. Thus, Le Figaro, which would be naturally more sensitive to the Pied-Noir 
plight, was never able to fully spark a dialogue about the Pieds-Noirs. This was a result of 
its more marked reluctance to cave in to the demands of the Algerian extremists.  
Elected officials were seen as representative interlocuteurs (June 3, 1959). Both 
Le Figaro and Le Monde, as shown in level 3 analysis, held tightly to the notion that the 
Algerian problem was an internal affair, which pushed the Pied-Noirs question even 
further from editorial scrutiny: “En Algérie, il n’est pas question de lois discriminatoires 
ni d’offenses à des droits humains…l’Algérie fait partie du territoire métropolitain, ses 
habitants—musulmans, juifs, chrétiens ont les mêmes droits et les mêmes devoirs” (Le 
Figaro, January 23, 1957).37 And later (explaining as well the view the French had on the 
Algerian nation): “Il n’y a pas de nation ou de nationalité algérienne” but “une différence 
musulmane” (November 2, 1957).38 
Another interesting aspect was the issue of the Pieds-Noirs. When this isuue was 
discussed later in the conflict, it was often relegated to a single mention in a list with 
material aspects such as concessions in the Sahara.  Competition to become a prominent 
human-interest issue was too great, thus, to allow any sort of progress past that stage in 
Down’s issue cycle.           
                                                 
37 In Algeria, discriminatory laws or human rights violations are not at issue…Algeria is a part of the 
French soil, and its inhabitants have all the same rights and duties. 
39 There is no nation or Algerian nationality, simply a Muslim nuance. 
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Differences in coverage were also quite evident.  Overt support, nonetheless for 
the Pieds-Noirs was more apparent in Le Figaro than in Le Monde.  In a front-page, open 
letter to the French in Algeria, Le Figaro states: “votre cause est la nôtre” (October 27, 
1959), a solidarity to which Le Monde never hinted at, even earlier in the war. 39  On 
September 19, 1957, Le Monde prints: “La minorité activiste d’Alger a senti que la 
majorité des Européens de souche ne la suivrait pas dans une opposition violente.”40 
Though  this quote represents Le Monde’s interpretation of reality, it is a highly 
subjective interpretation that Le Figaro never ventured into, until the augmentation in 
violence at the end of 1961 by the OAS, at which point Le Figaro was no longer decrying 
the status of the Pieds-Noirs.  On January 16, 1959, Le Monde’s analysis of the violence 
was such that violence from activists was bringing nothing but tit-for-tat responses by 
Algerian nationalists. This served to reverse causal responsibility for the conflict and 
created a psychose de peur (psychosis of fear) in France (January 15, 1961). “De folles et 
vaines résistances doivent en être définitivement découragées,” prints Le Monde on 
January 10, 1961.41  
 Le Monde does lament the situation of the Pieds-Noirs (October 15, 1959) and 
critiques de Gaulle for not mentioning the Pieds-Noirs in a speech (May 10, 1961). Le 
Monde also distinguishes much more between the activistes and the French residents of 
Algeria than Le Figaro. This is probably a large reason why, after the putsch there is a 
                                                 
39 Your cause is our cause. 
40The activist minority has sensed that the majority of moderates will not follow it in its violent 
opposition. 
41 Foolish and vain resistance must be definitively discouraged 
. 
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steep drop-off in mention of Pieds-Noirs in Le Figaro: cognitive balance would be 
difficult to maintain while supporting such marginalized (at least in the Metropole) 
activist groups. Accordingly Le Monde, benefiting from having already greatly criticized 
Pied-Noir activists, nor only continued mentioning the Pieds-Noirs but  also portraying 
them as antipathetic, if not hostile to the French government (several articles in May 
1961).       
 
FLN History and Analysis42   
  When students of history turn to the entity referred to as the Front de Libération 
Nationale, a reluctance is noted on the part of those originally involved to discuss the 
subject.  Accordingly a relative dearth of primary source material is observed.  
Interestingly, this feature is in itself characteristic of the organization’s principles of 
“popularist socialism” that marked Algeria, both at the time of its independence and 
today. Avoiding any semblance of a “cult of leader,” the leadership made certain that no 
one person become the symbol par excellence of the Algerian revolutionary efforts. Not 
even Ben Bella approached this image, even if his name often turned up in the press. 
Even the groups themselves, despite exterior diplomatic ties, were decentralized and 
loosely organized.  
                                                 
42 For the sake of balance, the following sources were used for the historical interpretations in this 
brief section: Stora (for the French perpective), Horne (for the non-French perspective) and Bennoune 
(for the Algerian perspective). Other historical references include both Quid (Frémy) and Pour 
comprendre la guerre d’Algérie (Duquesne).  
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 Figureheads were of course present.  Hadj Messali, through his organization 
Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD) was an early 
ideological influence of many of the youthful leaders of the Revolution, and eventually 
became a sort of adversary with the successor of the MTLD, the MNA.  One leader in 
particular, influenced by Messali, was again Ben Bella who founded the Organisation 
Spéciale (OS) in the same spirit of the MTLD. Following was the creation, with Ben 
Bella and the neuf historiques (original leaders from which the FLN would spring) the 
Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action (CRUA). This group, resembling a round 
table of leaders, brought together leaders at different times in the war for reasons of 
policy coordination but was not necessarily directly equipped with action and 
enforcement mechanisms.  The first outbreak of war at 0100h on November 1, 1954 was 
coordinated by such a committee with leading Algerian operatives, the “committee of 
twenty-two,” in what was to be considered the first meeting of the FLN (October 1954).  
 Despite the other organizations, the FLN, through insistence and downright 
coercion of other Algerians in Algeria and in France, eventually sopped up other 
moderate elements of Algerian liberation (including Messali’s MNA), and declared itself 
the sole governing authority; the GPRA would act in concert later.  Most visible to the 
French of this struggle was the aforementioned MNA-FLN rift, which suggests 
something of the French image of the FLN, explored below.  In 1957, furthermore, 
successful French reforms earned the loyalty of some Algerians.  These reforms served to 
spite the populist sentiments of the FLN and inspired internal bloodshed.  Less visible 
were early negotiations held in secret with the FLN, which would have, in a sense, 
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legitimized the FLN as a representative body in the eyes of the French.  Ultimately de 
Gaulle was forced to open more direct negotiations with the FLN as “the battle between 
France and the FLN began to depart from the blood-stained bled of Algeria for higher 
realms of politics and diplomacy” (Horne 1977: 397).  He thus turned more towards the 
FLN as the sole interlocuteur valable, or representative negotiator between the French 
government and Algerian nationalists.  
 
FLN Portrayal 
The Gallup polls highlight some interesting features that were chosen to explore 
in the two newspapers.  A poll taken in September1957 inquiring to the French about 
whether or not they believed that the Muslims approved of the “rebellion” shows clearly 
that it was believed that they indeed did not: only 24% of Algerians, thought the French, 
approved of the rebellion (Gallup 1976: 211).  Again, in February1959, similar numbers 
are born out, with only 20% of Algerians (so believed the French respondents) supporting 
the rebels (250).  By 1961, though, the FLN was believed to be much more 
representative, according to a poll taken in July: only 22% of the respondents believed 
that the FLN represented less than half of the population (291). By April 1962, 60% felt 
that the FLN represented half or more of the population (309).  The questions pertinent to 
this study then unfold: how is this change manifested in the two newspapers examined, 
and why did it occur over such a relatively long period of time (at least five years)? The 
first question is, of course, answered through an exploration in coverage by the two 
newspapers, looking at both similarities and differences. The second is answered by 
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highlighting their differences; different signals sent out by both papers translated to 
ambiguous messages that did little to change the perception of the consumer (see section 
on perception), already hardened by years of violence at the hands of the FLN. 
 As shown above in the discussion of level 1, both newspapers marginalize the 
Algerian insurgents early in the conflict.  Le Monde describes the rebel action as 
“l’entreprise d’un extrêmisme révolutionnaire délibérément hostile à toute recherche 
d’une voie politique moyenne” (August 23, 1955).43 However, Le Figaro, also as shown 
above, remains more dedicated to an Us/Them concept through the advanced stages of 
the conflict. The editors at Le Figaro portrayed the Algerians insurgents as an opposition  
that continually gravitated towards conflict, possessing an “esprit incliné naturellement 
vers l’activisme et le non-compromis” (March 14, 1961).44 By then, dialogue about 
resolving the conflict through the GPRA and FLN had been flourishing on the pages of 
Le Monde, contrary to Le Figaro. This latter, of course, dedicated less space to second-
order issues, and preferred (after the politicians were shown ineffective), somewhat 
ambiguously, the Algerian people as the sole interlocuteur valable: “Mais le peuple 
algérien veut la paix,” prints Le Figaro (May 25, 1961).45 And, to deflate the diplomatic 
importance of the FLN: “la réaction du FLN aux mesures libérales françaises en Algérie 
[est] séverement jugée par l’opinion mondiale” (May, 23, 1961).46 In retrospect this 
seems a tactic that probably avoided the accumulation of cognitive dissonance on the part 
                                                 
 
43 The undertaking of a revolutionary extremism deliberately hostile to any moderate solution. 
44 Spirit with natural inclinations towards the activism and non-compromise. 
45 But the Algerian people want peace.  
46 The reaction of the FLN to liberal French measures in Algeria is too severely judged by the world. 
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of the editors of Le Figaro;  one can surmise, from the dismissive tone directed at the 
GPRA and FLN throughout the war by Le Figaro, that the editors were left without a 
truly democratic solution to propose. Certainly, neither the GPRA nor the FLN were 
technically democratic, but they were organizations that were accepted as approximating 
the nationalist Algerian voice.  One can thus begin to sense the dilemma faced by the 
editors, and indeed France, in approaching the whole of this conflict. 
 The press portrayal of the GPRA itself represents an interesting phenomenon in 
terms of the differences between the two newspapers.  At first, both were equally leery of 
this group, for some time placing GPRA in quotes as though not a “real” organization 
interested in conflict resolution.  However, Le Monde, unlike Le Figaro, gradually 
warmed up to the thought that this solely political organization, acting with connections 
to the FLN but free from the violent implications that the FLN had in tow, could be an 
interlocuteur valable.47  Indeed, this represents the “PR” ingenuity of the creation of the 
GPRA by those struggling for independence in Algeria. On March 29, 1961, Le Monde 
reports, to the credit of the GPRA, that “Si le GPRA ne peut représenter la totalité du 
peuple algérien, il n’est peut-être pas utile de compromettre, par des initiatives 
importantes, les chances d’accord avec la majorité dont il se réclame.”48  
                                                 
47 On November 11, Le Monde asks, clairvoyantly in retrospect, if it is possible that “d’ici quelques 
semaines ou quelque mois, le FLN aura cessé d’être une organisation insurrectionnelle vouée aux 
coups de mains sanglants et à l’action terroriste, pour se transformer en un parti politique?” (In a few 
weeks or months from now, will the FLN have ceased being an insurrectional organization, dedicated 
to bloody acts of terrorism, to transform itself into a politcal party?) Clearly, this speaks for the need 
of finding an interlocuteur valable, and thus, in a sense, cognitive balance.  
48 Although the GPRA does not represent the totality of the Algerian people, it is perhaps unwise to 




The next month, a tone of empathy is even accorded to the GPRA by Le Monde, 
remarking that, like France having to restrain the ultras, so to does the GPRA face an 
onerous task in restraining certain extremists. Moreover, even if Le Figaro never really 
picked up on the GPRA in the same way that Le Monde did, one could conjecture that the 
existence of the GPRA eventually led the way for a greater dialogue between warring 
parties. The reason lies in the GPRA’s less tainted nature which could fulfill certain 
needs for cognitive balance in this bloody conflict.  This balance ultimately allowed for 
more support of the FLN, by association to the GPRA. 
 In the press, the GPRA, even if not considered wholly democratic, was not 
considered a violent extension of the FLN or even an outright competitor of its disruptive 
partner.  However the MNA was rather often portrayed as in conflict with the FLN (“lutte 
sanglante,”  bloody struggle characterizes Le Figaro in June 1959 in typical vivid 
language), and though the MNA was certainly more often portrayed as embroiled in 
internecine fighting with the FLN than in negotiations or struggles against the French 
government, this struggle between rivals also contributed, it seems, to a lesser 
representative value accorded to the FLN by the French. This struggle is presented more 
often in Le Figaro, which brings to light another point of difference between the two 
papers: that Le Figaro’s portrayal of the FLN was more focused on moments of weakness 
experienced by the organization, which most likely served to heighten the readership’s 
sense that the FLN was not as representative of diverse peoples as it purported itself to 
be. Indeed, only 15% of French in 1957 considered Algerians as composing a single 
nation, so the notions held by the French people regarding the composition of 
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organizations such as the FLN are a priori biased against the efficacy of one single 
organization reflecting the interests of even a strong minority of Algerians (Gallup 1976: 
211). The flat refusal of Le Figaro is thus understood: “Il n’y aurait rien à négocier, le 
préalable mis par le FLN à négocier était la reconnaissance d’indépendance…ce qui ne 
nous intéresse pas plus” (June 29, 1957).49 
 Weaknesses of the FLN were constantly highlighted by the Le Figaro and in 
another thesis, one could pursue this Us/Them, Strong/Weak dichotomy as gender bias in 
the media. Warlike language of Le Figaro, intended figuratively, such as “FLN 
décapité”—FLN decapitated (November 1957), adds a masculine air of aggression. For 
the purposes of the study,  several examples will be illustrated from throughout the 
wartime period showing how the FLN held the attention of the press (1957-1961). In 
September 1957, the failure of a strike by the FLN is reported; in December of the same 
year, failures of diplomatic gestures abroad are emphasized; and finally in 1961, the 
failure of negotiations, with causal attribution directed at the FLN, is highlighted.  Thus, 
not only is the FLN more prominently causally blamed for terrorist activities than in Le 
Monde (as shown above), but also, any formal, nonviolent maneuverings attempted by 
the FLN that fall short are emphasized overtly by Le Figaro as failures of the FLN.          
   The final feature that estranged the FLN from the Metropole, related to the 
French government’s assertion of sovereignty in this issue, is the fact that overtures to the 
East (USSR, China) and to Arab states were not highly considered by the newspapers.  In 
                                                 
49 There is nothing to negotiate with the FLN, since the condition put forth by the FLN is the 
recognition of independence…which no longer interests us. 
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January 1961, Le Figaro rigidly stated that the FLN must choose between the Orient and 
negotiation, an attitude not leaving much room for compromise.  It is quite likely that this 
attitude is linked to the reflexive distrust of the UN as a forum for debate about Algeria. 
States such as Syria often led tirades vilifying France, who often had to scurry about to 
keep diplomatic ties strong with other disapproving nations.    







































 Tools of content analysis, tempered with historical details, are useful in gaining 
access to the signifié, which is explicative of how people think (or do not).  In the case 
presented, one observes two respected and seemingly similar newspapers in terms of 
philosophy and trends in raw space dedicated to the war. A closer analysis, though, yields 
points of distinction between the newspapers.  One, Le Monde, is amenable to change, 
although the rate was undoubtedly affected by the government constantly tightening 
controls on the press.  Nonetheless, we witness change in Le Monde through a qualitative 
analysis of violence-oriented level 1 articles over time.  As we have witnessed, these 
articles slowly became more balanced in terms of recognizing the numerous parties 
implicated in the war and portrayal of the FLN.  Furthermore, there are fewer level 1 
articles in Le Monde than in its counterpart.  Political level 2 articles and thematic stories 
are favored, which suggests that qualities of dialogue are present in the newspaper.  This 
was confirmed by an analysis of the articles.  Another change involves the perception of 
the FLN and GPRA as interlocuteurs valables. Though never supporting the acts of these 
organizations, per se, Le Monde was certainly progressive in the consideration it gave to 
these rebel groups.  
Not only is the fact of what is reported salient, but the manner of how it is 
reported makes a difference as well; less total conflict portrayal in Le Monde and a less 
categorically negative framing of the FLN than Le Figaro are important distinctions. 
Furthermore, despite Le Figaro’s greater emphasis on the war, it is Le Monde which is 
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ensnared by a less than sympathetic government. The government certainly fostered a 
variety of perspectives through its subsidization of the press. But at the same time it could 
control the agenda in this tense decade when technology, increasing transparency and 
changing attitudes, caused government to be more liable for their action. 
  Le Figaro was a victim of its own propensities for cognitive balance and lack of 
second-order dialogue. The micro-issue of the Pieds-Noirs, who were essentially 
abandoned by the sympathizing paper, demonstrates this tension. Competing issues kept 
the Pied-Noir issue submerged. This contradiction is, moreover, emblematic of the 
conflict itself, where the average, peace-minded citizen was caught between a ferociously 
dedicated and single-platformed group, the FLN, and a reluctance vis-à-vis the 
patrimoine to renounce the residual interests in Algeria.     
 The result of both the panoply of opinions competing at the newsstand and 
paradoxes like the one illustrated above is that the consumer failed to fulfill the necessary 
information/time (“I”) obligations for “opinion acquisition” or modification. Urgency 
increased as suggested by the polls even through periods of lesser coverage, meaning that 
“I” in the sense of the overall issue was sufficient for change; therefore the problem grew 
as the options multiplied and became complicated, showing a multilevel cogency of “I”. 
De Gaulle, in his politically brilliant manner, sensed the politically volatile situation and 
often remained ambiguous and mysterious in his policy declarations; perhaps, in 
retrospect, this was necessary for two nations so long attached based on terms of 
settlement, rather than on simple economic terms. Only when personal risk increased 
(mostly through the OAS) did both the newspapers and government accelerate the drive 
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to a satisfactory conclusion, no doubt seen as a sort of Nash equilibrium by those of 
France, especially those of the opinion of Brisson.   
 Thus viewing history and modern thought through the lens of press coverage and 
public opinion nets useful data not only in terms of speculating effects of the press on the 
destinataire, but also in the consideration of how this process affects subsequent events.  
More acceptance for the FLN by a war-weary people was facilitated by press coverage of 
the FLN, essentially the sole way of educating a people on such a new, secretive 
organization.  Accordingly, the government could more openly pursue options for peace. 
CA of the press also results in an improved understanding of both the perpetuation and 
changing of stereotypes, which can often be difficult to comprehend in hindsight. 
Attitude perpetuation in this study is seen through the Pied-Noir coverage in Le Figaro 
and change is observed through FLN coverage in Le Monde.    
 To conclude, CA does not stop at a simple analysis of numbers of front-page 
coverage; doing so would ignore the rich, layered universe of approaches to dealing with 
the complexity of press coverage and the quantity of information.  The perception index, 
levels of analysis, concepts of framing (such as episodic and thematic analyses) all play a 
role in harvesting data interesting in itself as well as in pursuing the micro-issues such as 
the Pieds-Noirs and the FLN. In a final word, the increasing transparency provided by the 
media today will do nothing but strengthen government accountability to its constituency. 
Being aware of these links and their ramifications is of paramount interest to a democracy 
where the government, like that of the Fourth Republic, may eventually be toppled by 
such issues as the Algerian Revolution. 
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November 1 Coordinated attacks on the French by Algerians across Algeria 
mark the beginning of hostilities 
 
November 12               Mendès-France (President of the Council in France) declares 
“l’Algérie, c’est la France” (“Algeria is France”) 
 
1955  
   
 January  26                Jacques Soustelle named gouverneur général of Algeria 
 
 May 11                      The government of Faure in France decides to pursue a policy of 
neutralizing the leaders of the Revolution 
 
 August 20                  Algerian insurrections north of Constantine with French civilian 
casualties; France responds by executing hundreds of Muslims 
1956           
 
February 2  Soustelle leaves Algeria 
 
February 7                  Robert Lacoste named minstre-résident (French government 
representative in Algeria) 
 
March 11 Special powers accorded to French government by Parliament 
 
April  4 Henri-François Maillot, a communist leader, deserts the French 
army and delivers arms to the Algerians 
 
April 6 Battle of Djeurf 
  
April 11 Algerian Assembly dissolved following the resignation of many 
Muslims 
 
May 18  Palestro (French vessel) sinks 
 
June  Members of the rebel group, the FLN, are executed; Muslim 
insurrection; Europeans storm Casbah in response 
                                                 
50 Adapted from Quid 2001  (Frémy) pp. 938-939 (2000). 
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September Secret negotiations between French and Algerian leaders in Rome 
fail 
 
September 30 Milk Bar and Caféteria bombings in Algiers by Muslims 
 
October 16 Athos (carrying arms for Algerians) is sunk 
 
October 22 Ben Bella and other revolutionary leaders captured when French 




January Battle of Algiers begins; numerous terrorist attacks and strikes roll 
across both Algiers and Constantine over next few months, with 
equally vicious counter-terrorist measures taken by the French 
army 
 
April French intellectuals including Simone de Beauvoir protest against 
French involvement in conflict 
 
September 30 Reforms voted down by National Assembly in Paris; later 
amended and voted in 
 
October Internecine fighting among Algerian rebel groups including the 
FLN 
 




January Electric fence built along Tunisian frontier; petroleum exploration 
of the Sahara begins; Battle of Djebel Alahoun 
 
February Air attacks by France stepped up, some effected by General Salan 
without the knowledge of Paris; Salan launches a “Vive de Gaulle” 
 
June 4 De Gaulle declares “Je vous ai compris” (I understand you) at 
Algiers and “Algérie française” (French Algeria) for the only time 
 
October 23 “Paix des Braves” (Gentlemen’s peace) proposed by De Gaulle 
rejected by GPRA who, with the FLN hardened in their condition 
of independence before any negotiations 
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December Salan shares power with General Challe; Delouvrier, the civilian 




August De Gaulle’s tour in Algeria; declares “moi vivant, jamais le 
drapeau du FLN ne flottera sur l’Algérie” (As long as I am alive, 
the FLN flag will never fly over Algeria) 
 
September De Gaulle proposes self-determination (will pass in January 1961), 
secession but association; Delouvrier: “nous nous battons pour 




January Barricades and protests by Europeans in Algiers 
 
March De Gaulle continues to insist on France’s right to stay in Algeria 
 




February-March Secret negotiations in Switzerland; Mayor of Evian is killed, 
probably by French extremists; creation of OAS by Lagaillarde 
 
April Putsch of French Generals marks apogee of power struggle 
between the French government and French military; OAS attacks 





March Evian Accords and cease-fire 
 
July Self-determination referendum (less abstention and more favorable 









APPENDIX B: GALLUP POLLS (MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM) 
 
 
Most Important Problem (top three answers given here) 
October 1956 
















What is the most important problem for France at the present? 
 
Algeria……………………………………….37% 
Problems with the financial situation/budget..31 












What is the most important problem for France at the moment? 
 
The Algerian problem……..64% 






What is the most important problem facing France at the moment? 
 
Algeria…………50% 
Peace in Algeria..28 








Stability of Government.4 
 
May 1962 





























APPENDIX C:  GALLUP POLLS (UNITED NATIONS) 
 
September 1949 







Should France follow or not follow the advice of the United Nations concerning Africa? 
 
Should follow……18% 




Do you have great confidence, some confidence little confidence or no confidence in the 
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